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ARTICLES
WILL SHRINKWRAP SUFFOCATE FAIR USE?
Elizabeth M.N. Morrist
Abstract
This article explores the balance between using copyright law
and contract law to protect intellectual property, specifically
computer software. This article analyzes the balance between the
software creator's rights and the public good that results from access
to the source code. Section II gives a general overview of the types of
protection available to software producers. Section III discusses
contract protection for software and the growing acceptance of
shrinkwrap licenses and other adhesion agreements as valid
contracts. Section IV discusses traditional copyright protection for
software in great detail. It discusses the exclusive rights under
copyright law as well as the fair use exception to these exclusive
rights. Section V discusses the Digital Millennium Copyright Act
(DMCA) and its reverse engineering exceptions. Section VI explains
how contract law, traditional copyright law, and the DMCA work
together, and how preemption doctrines control what happens when
they are in conflict with one another. Section VII argues that
decisions that uphold adhesion contract prohibitions on reverse
engineering were wrong because they did not properly apply
preemption analysis. Section VIII argues that the precedents set such
decisions are especially frightening when applied to the DMCA.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are looking for a particular computer program,
perhaps to give you the ability to track your finances, edit your digital
pictures, or an endless host of other possibilities for which there is
software that is readily available off the shelf for your consumption.
You go down to your local computer store and find an attractive
option. You buy it, take it home, and open it. Inside the box is a little
pamphlet containing terms of your "license" for this product. If you
are like most American consumers you throw this "license" away,
pop the CD into your computer and start using the program. But let us
step back and take a look at that little pamphlet. What is it? What
rights and limitations does it give to you as a consumer? Why do
software developers include it with your CD? This article will
consider the broader implications for society embodied in these little
pamphlets. It will analyze when courts should and should not enforce
their "license" terms.
Intellectual property law attempts to strike an appropriate
balance between the individual's private property interest in their
creations and the general public's interest in having access to
knowledge and innovation.' The Constitution states that, "Congress
shall have the Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries."'
The purpose of this Constitutional provision is to promote public
access to innovative works and inventions, which thereby promotes
the development of art, science, and industry.3 The financial reward
guaranteed to the author or inventor is just a result of this general
objective, rather than an end in itself.4 As a result, courts must
sometimes subordinate an author or inventor's interest in a maximum
financial return for the greater public good of the development of art,
science, and industry.5 Contract law on the other hand does not have
such well-defined methods of balancing personal and societal
interests. Thus, the use of "licenses" like the ones mentioned above is
1. See J.H. Reichman, Legal Hybrids Between the Patent and Copyright Paradigms, 94
COLUM. L. REV. 2432, 2436-42 (1994).
2. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
3. Anthony J. Mahajan, Intellectual Property, Contracts, and Reverse Engineering After
ProCD: A Proposed Compromise for Computer Software, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3297, 3321
(1999).
4. Berlin v. E. C. Publ'ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 543-44 (2d Cir. 1964).
5. Id.
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a dangerous method of protecting intellectual property because it
gives nearly unbridled power to the innovators.
This article will explore the balance between using copyright and
contract law to protect intellectual property. It will look specifically at
protections for computer software. This article analyzes the balance
between the individual computer software creator's rights and the
public good that results from access to computer software source
code. Section II gives a general overview of the types of protection
available to software producers. Section III discusses contract
protection for software and the growing acceptance of shrinkwrap
licenses and other adhesion agreements as valid contracts. Section IV
discusses traditional copyright protection for software in great detail.
It discusses the exclusive rights under copyright law as well as the fair
use exception to these exclusive rights. It also discusses recent case
law, which has determined that reverse engineering software object
code is a fair use of copyrighted software.6 Section V discusses the
Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) and its reverse
engineering exceptions. 7 Section VI explains how contract law,
traditional copyright law, and the DMCA work together, and how
preemption doctrines control what happens when they are in conflict
with one another. It discusses two methods of preemption, statutory
preemption and constitutional preemption, which are used to
determine when federal copyright law preempts state contract law. It
gives two example cases of preemption analysis, Bowers v. Baystate
Technologies, Inc.8 and Davidson & Associates v. Jung.9 Section VII
argues that Bowers and Davidson decisions wrongly upheld adhesion
contract prohibitions on reverse engineering because these decisions
did not properly apply preemption analysis.' 0 Section VIII argues that
the precedents set in Bowers and Davidson are especially scary when
applied to the DMCA. It argues that because the DMCA already gives
a more limited scope of protection than traditional copyright law,
courts should be especially wary of enforcing license terms in
adhesion contracts for products covered under the DMCA protection.
Copyright law protection carefully balances the interests of an
individual creator with the good of the public in having access to their
6. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
7. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
8. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
9. Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
10. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidson &
Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
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creation. l The "fair use" test balances these competing interests.1 2
However, shrinkwrap licenses, and other adhesion contracts, often
attempt to prohibit actions that would other wise be allowed under the
"fair use" balancing test. Courts should not allow this unfair
"licensing" scheme to prohibit otherwise fair uses of a product.
Courts should instead use preemption analysis to subjugate contract
law (state law) to copyright law (federal law) whenever the two
conflict. 13 Unfortunately, as can be seen in Bowers and Davidson,
there has been a recent trend to uphold these unfair prohibitions
through an unusually narrow preemption analysis.1 4 If courts do not
reverse this trend, fair use may be totally subsumed by over reaching
shrinkwrap license prohibitions, in other words shrinkwrap may
suffocate fair use.
II. METHODS OF PROTECTING COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Computer technology has emerged as a major driving force of
the American economy in the past few decades. Software, hardware,
and the World Wide Web have created an ease of communicating
unprecedented in previous times. A long felt problem facing
technology producers has been how to adequately protect their
intellectual property in the marketplace. 5 For the sake of clarity, this
paper will look at this issue in the limited context of computer
software development.
There is a significant amount of effort and expense necessarily
involved in the creation of software.' 6 Therefore, software developers
have long been looking for a means of software protection. 1
7
Computer software was not originally protected by either copyright or
patent protection.' 8 Thus, software producers turned to contract law
and technological locks to for protection.
11. See Reichman, supra note 1, at 2436-42.
12. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
13. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
14. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidson &
Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
15. See Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidson &
Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
16. Brian Paul Menard, And The Shirt Off Your Back: Universal City Studios, DeCSS,
And The Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 27 Rutgers Computer & Tech. L.J. 371, 381 (2001)
(stating that the losses to the Business Software Alliance to piracy were S12 billion in 1999).
17. See Deanna L. Kwong, Copyright-Contract Intersection, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L.J.
349 (2003).
18. Stephen Fraser, Canada-United States Trade Issues: Back from Purgatory? Why
Computer Software "Shrink-Wrap" Licenses Should Be Laid to Rest, 6 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP.
[Vol. 23
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Software developers protected themselves through contract law
under by devising licenses, usually shrinkwrap licenses, to obtain
protection for their products.' 9 Another method that developed before
copyright and patent protections were given to software was trade
secret protection through technological protections. 20 This originated
as distribution of software only with machine-readable object code
rather than human readable source code.2'
Copyright protection was expanded to include computer
software in 1980.22 Patent protection was given to computer software
to a limited degree in 1994.23 Despite these new protection methods,
unfortunately the old methods of protection have continued to
develop even after copyright and patent protections were allowed for
computer software.24  This has created a situation of unfair
overprotection for software.
This article concentrates on copyright protections, shrinkwrap
licensing, and technological protections. The law in these areas
sometimes conflicts, and when it does the doctrine of preemption
decides which area of law will be followed.25 Because copyright law
is federal law while contract law is state law, the preemption doctrine
tells us that the federal law should usually prevail.26 However, there
has been a recent trend to uphold contract law over copyright law. 27
This is potentially dangerous to the progress of technological
innovation because contract law does not have the well-litigated "fair
use" balancing test between society and the individual creator of
copyright law.
L. 183, 189 (1998).
19. Thomas M. S. Herrmmes, Restraints of Alienation, Equitable Servitudes, and the
Feudal Nature of Computer Software Licensing, 71 DENV. U. L. REV. 577, 578-80 (1994).
20. Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property and Shrinkwrap Licenses, 68 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1243 (1995).
21. See Himanshu A. Amin, The Lack of Protection Afforded Software Under the Current
Intellectual Property Laws, 43 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 19, 21 (1995).
22. See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2000).
23. See In re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1542-45 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (holding that patentability
is not precluded even though a computer program contains mathematical subject matter).
24. Id
25. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
26. Id.
27. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidson &
Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005).
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III. CONTRACT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Even before computer software had been protectable under
copyright law, computer software developers had used contracts to
protect their works. 28 After copyright protections were introduced for
computer software, developers used contract law as a means to
prohibit what would otherwise have been considered a lawful fair use
copy of the software.29
Under traditional contract law, it is assumed that a contract is
formed by the agreement of two parties of equal bargaining power
during the course of free negotiation. 30 Before the advent of consumer
software, this type of mutual bargained for exchange occurred
because only large entities could afford software and so the lawyers
for both the computer owners and the software developers drafted the
contracts for the software sales transactions.3 ' In such a case, the
traditional provisions of contract law worked well to protect the
software developers. As personal computers became affordable one
on one negotiation became unmanageable. Software developers
needed a way to produce a contractually binding agreement that did
not impede the flow of their product into the stream of commerce.32
As sales boomed between software companies and consumers it
was impossible to freely negotiate contracts between each consumer
and the company.33 Therefore, "shrinkwrap licenses" became
popular.34 A shrinkwrap license typically "offers" terms that the
purchaser of the software "accepts" by opening the cellophane
wrapper that encases the package containing the computer software.
35
Shrinkwrap license are now universally accepted as a type of
valid contract, but this was not always so. 36 In the early days of
shrinkwrap licenses, courts did not often recognize the terms that they
contained, usually because the courts found that the contract had been
28. Hemmnes, supra note 19, at 578-80.
29. See Maureen A. O'Rourke, Drawing the Boundary Between Copyright and Contract.
Copyright Preemption of Software License Terms, 45 DUKE L.J. 479, 523-28 (1995).
30. See I E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS § 4.26 (2d ed. 2001).
31. See 3-4A DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW 4A.02[4], at 4A-141 (1996).
32. Christopher L. Pitet, The Problem with "Money Now, Terms Later:" ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg and the Enforceability of the "Shrinkwrap" Software Licenses, 31 LoY. L.A. L.
REV. 325, 329 (1997).
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. See MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, 5-27 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT, §
27.02[B], at 27-14 (Matthew Bender & Co. 2002).
36. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1248-53.
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formed at the point of sale or a time preceding the point at which a
consumer was given the opportunity to review the terms in the
license. 37 The Court in Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology determined that a contract between the parties was
formed before the purchasing party had an opportunity to review the
terms of the license, and therefore the shrinkwrap license was just a
proposed modification to the contract that the buyer did not accept.
3 8
Similarly, the court in Arizona Retail Systems, Inc. v. Software Link,
Inc. held that when Arizona Retail had made several contracts with
the subsequent purchaser, only the original purchase included the
license terms because the formation of the subsequent contracts had
already occurred before the buyer could read the license.39 Therefore,
the terms of these shrinkwrap licenses were not enforceable parts of
the contracts between the parties in each of these cases because the
court determined that the contract was formed at the point of sale or
sometime shortly thereafter.4 °
In the 1980s and early 1990s courts declared that shrinkwrap
licenses were generally unenforceable under U.C.C. Sections 2-207
and 2-209.4 1 However, the Seventh Circuit pioneered a judicial trend
toward the enforcement of shrinkwrap licenses in ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg.42 The court held that a contract could be formed at a time
other than at the point of sale when the software producer stipulated
acceptance by another means.43 Since the ProCD case, courts have
generally held that shrinkwrap licenses are generally enforceable.44
A. Analysis of Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse
Technology
45
Step-Saver Data Systems, Inc. v. Wyse Technology is an example
of an early court's determination that shrinkwrap licenses were
unenforceable. 46 In Step-Saver, the court considered whether
37. See, e.g., Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105-06 (3d Cir.
1991).
38. Id.
39. Arizona Retail Sys., Inc. v. Software Link, Inc., 831 F. Supp. 759, 764 (D. Ariz.
1993).
40. See Step-Saver, 939 F.2d at 105-06.
41. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1248-53.
42. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
43. Id. at 1452.
44. Scott J. Spooner, The Validation of Shrink-Wrap and Click-Wrap Licenses by
Virginia's Uniform Computer Information Transaction Act, 7 RiCH. J.L. & TECH. 27, 34 (2001).
45. Step-SaverData Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
46. Id.
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shrinkwrap terms sent after a phone order had been placed were a part
of the contractual agreement.47 The license agreement was printed on
the outside of the box and disclaimed all warranties.4 8 However, the
box was not sent to the buyer until after the purchases had been
placed.49 When the product failed, Step-Saver sued Wyse for breach
of warranty. 50 Wyse argued that the shrinkwrap license provision had
effectively disclaimed all warranties. 5' The Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit court disagreed.52 The Court stated that the contract had
formed on the phone, before Step-Saver had an opportunity to read
the terms of the license.53 Thus, the Court concluded that the dispute
was in fact "not over the existence of the contract, but the nature of its
terms. 54 The court determined the terms of the contract through
analysis of section 2-207 of the UCC.55 The applicable section of 2-
207 states that additional terms become part of the contract if they do
not "materially alter it."'56 The court found that the license's
disclaimer of warranties materially altered the contract formed on the
phone, and therefore was not a part of the contract.
57
B. Analysis of ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg 58
In early cases, like Step-Saver, in which software developers
tried to use shrinkwrap licenses to protect their products the
developers were unsuccessful because the courts determined that the
contract between the buyer and seller was formed before the buyer
had the opportunity to review the license terms.59 However, this
situation changed when ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg determined that
47. Id. at 95-98.
48. Id. at 94-95.
49. Id. at 95-96.
50. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 94 (3d Cir. 1991).
51. Id.at 94-95.
52. Id. at 105.
53. Seeid at 98.
54. Id.
55. Id. at98-106.
56. U.C.C. § 2-207(2)(b) (1995).
57. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91, 105 (3d Cir. 1991). ("[W]e
must conclude that adding the disclaimer of warranty and limitation of remed[y] provisions from
the box-top license would, as a matter of law, substantially alter the distribution of risk between
Step-Saver and TSL.").
58. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996).
59. See Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991).
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the contract did not have to be formed at the time of sale, but could be
formed at a time determined by the software producer. 60
In the ProCD case, ProCD made a database, called SelectPhone,
which kept track of names and addresses of many people.6' It engaged
in price discrimination, charging businesses a higher price for its
product than it charged to individual consumers.62 In order to make
this price discrimination work, ProCD included a shrinkwrap contract
in its consumer product that declared that use of the application
program and listings was limited to noncommercial purposes. 63
Zeidenberg bought a consumer package of the SelectPhone database
but ignored the license. 64 Instead Zeidenberg made the database
available on the Internet for a price.65 ProCD sued for a breach of
contract. 66 The Court looked at the UCC to see if the terms in the
shrinkwrap license were enforceable. 67 The UCC states in section 2-
204(1) that "a contract for sale of goods may be made in any manner
sufficient to show agreement, including conduct by both parties which
recognizes the existence of such a contract." 68 The Court noted that it
is well accepted that the offeror is the master of his offer and may
invite acceptance by conduct, and may propose limitations on the
kind of conduct that constitutes acceptance. 69 The Court then
concluded that although "a contract can be, and often is, formed
simply by paying the price and walking out of the store, the UCC
permits contracts to be formed in other ways. '' 70 ProCD proposed that
a buyer would show acceptance of the license terms by using the
software after having an opportunity to read the license at leisure.7'
Section 2-206(1)(b) states that a buyer accepts goods when, after an
opportunity to inspect, he fails to make an effective rejection.72
"ProCD extended an opportunity to reject if [the] buyer should find
the license terms unsatisfactory; Zeidenberg inspected the package,
tried out the software, learned of the license, and did not reject the
60. See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
61. Id. at 1449.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 1450.
64. Id.
65. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1450 (7th Cir. 1996).
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1452.
68. U.C.C. § 2-204(1) (1987) (2003).
69. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452 (7th Cir. 1996).
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. U.C.C. § 2-206(1) (2003).
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goods. 73 Therefore, the Court concluded that Zeidenberg accepted
the offer when he used the software.74 The Court therefore concluded
that the shrinkwrap terms were a part of the contract.75 Thus, the
analysis of ProCD lead the way for software producers to use contract
law, namely shrinkwrap type licenses, to protect their creations before
software had the protection of other intellectual property regimes.
IV. COPYRIGHT PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Copyright protection for computer software began in 1980.76
However, given the nature of copyright law, protection of computer
software is limited to only the code of the software and not the
underlying idea of the program.77 Under copyright protection an idea
is not protected, only the specific expression of an idea is protected.78
This is called the "idea expression dichotomy." The principle is "that
[copyright] protection does not extend to the ideas encapsulated in a
work, but only to the original expression those ideas., 79 This makes
sense for a novel, but fails in the software context because software is
rarely written for the purpose of being read for enjoyment. The idea
expression dichotomy is also codified in § 102(b) of the Copyright
Act,80 which states that "[i]n no case does copyright protection of an
original work of authorship extend to any idea, procedure, process,
system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery,
regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated,
or embodied in such work.
81
Copyright protection is still advantageous to a software
developer in that it gives creators certain rights against those who
copy the software directly or who use the copy to create an almost
identical product.82 The Copyright Act also gives the copyright owner
the exclusive right to reproduce the original work and to prepare
derivative works from the original.8 3 The exclusive right to reproduce
a copyrighted work is codified in § 106(1) of the Copyright Act which
73. ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (7th Cir. 1996).
74. Id. at 1452.
75. Id. at 1448.
76. See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2000).
77. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
78. Id.
79. Mahajan, supra note 3, at 3300.
80. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b).
81. Id.
82. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 106(1)-(2) (2000).
83. Id.
[Vol. 23
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states, "Subject [to certain limitations] the owner of copyright under
this title has the exclusive rights to ... reproduce the copyrighted
work in copies or phonorecords." 84 The exclusive right to prepare
derivative works is codified in § 106(2) which states that the
copyright owner has the exclusive right to "prepare derivative works
based upon the copyrighted work.,
85
A. The Fair Use Exception
Despite the aforementioned exclusive rights, copyrighted works
are subject to certain limitations. Copyright law has the constitutional
objective of promoting the sciences. 86 This objective encourages
public access to knowledge and innovation through creating
incentives for individual authors to disseminate their writings.8 7 This
objective obtained by giving creators exclusive rights over their
creations for a limited time.88 This objective is also obtained by
placing exceptions, such as "fair use," on those exclusive rights.
89
The fair use exception was originally judicially created. 90 The
exception was codified in 1978 as § 107 of the Copyright Act,9 1
which states that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of sections 106 and 106A, the fair
use of a copyrighted work, including such use by reproduction in
copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that
section, for purposes such as criticism, comment, news reporting,
teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use),
scholarship, or research, is not an infringement of copyright.
92
The four non-exclusive statutory factors that courts must
consider when evaluating fair use include:
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational
purposes;
84. Id. § 106(1).
85. Id. § 106(2).
86. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 8.
87. Kodj Gbegnon, Digitized Scholarship and the "Library" Concept: Allowing the
History of the Library Exemption to Inform How We View Google's Digitized Library, 29
HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 75, 88 (2006).
88. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.; 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
89. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
90. See generally Folsom v. Marsh, 9 F. Cas. 342 (Dist. Mass. 1841).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
92. Id.
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(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
93
Courts must balance these four non-exclusive factors94 in
determining when copying software code and using the copy to create
a similar product is a fair use and when it is an infringement of the
exclusive right of reproduction or the exclusive right of preparing
derivative works.
B. Reverse Engineering - A Fair Use Exception for
Copyrighted Software
Reverse engineering is an important example of the fair use
exception applied to copyrighted software. 95 As stated above, because
copyright does not protect the underlying idea embodied in a work96,
reverse engineering a copyrighted product is a fair way to learn about
the ideas embodied in a copyrighted work. Reverse engineering can
be defined generally as a "fair and honest means ... [of] starting with
the known product and working backwards to divine the process
which aided its development or manufacture. 97 For example, in the
mechanical world, reverse engineering is usually just the process of
taking something apart to determine what makes it "tick. ' '98 In
computer software, reverse engineering is generally regarded as the
process of deriving a program's human-readable source code from its
machine-readable object code. 99 It then involves analyzing the code
once it is in a human readable format in order to understand the
concepts embedded in the code. 10 0 Reverse Engineering is necessary
for users and developers who desire to examine the structural and
93. Id. The fair use factors are non-exclusive because the term "shall" in the statute
preamble leaves room for other factors to be considered. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
96. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Service Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 350 (1991); Mahajan,
supra note 3, at 3300.
97. Kewannee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 476 (1974).
98. Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 843, 843 (1994).
99. Charles McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of
Computer Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH L.J. 25,
29(1993).
100. See Mahajan, supra note 3, at 3314.
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technical parameters of a computer program because object code is
not intelligible to humans.'°l
1. Reasons to Reverse Engineer
There are reasons to reverse engineer that are accepted as fair
use and reasons that are not. 102 First, one might reverse engineer a
program for educational purposes, either to study and learn from it, or
to teach computer programming to students.10 3 Use for educational
purposes is "fair use" as it is defined under the Copyright Act.10 4 A
second reason is for users to make the existing program more
effective.10 5 Users may reverse engineer in order to debug, customize,
or modify the program's source code.'0 6 This is also likely to be
considered fair use in most circumstances. A third reason is when
computer software programmers wish to develop a product that is
compatible or interoperable with the existing product.'0 7 Likewise,
this use is most likely considered fair use. A final reason to reverse
engineer is to develop a competing product. 0 8 Courts have considered
reverse engineering in order to develop a competing product fair use
in some circumstances.10 9
One of the factors in determining whether an action is considered
fair use is "the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value
of the copyrighted work"' 0 Clearly a competing product will have an
effect on the potential market for a computer software product.
However, this is not the only purpose of fair use that courts must
consider. Courts have found that reverse engineering for the purpose
of creating competing and interoperable products is regarded as a
101. McManis, supra note 99, at 28-29.
102. Mahajan, supra note 3, at 3314-15.
103. G. Gervaise Davis, 111, Scope of Protection of Computer-Based Works; Reverse
Engineering, Clean Rooms and Decompilation, in 15th Annual Computer Law Institute 115,
142 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course Handbook Series No. 370,
1993).
104. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
105. McManis, supra note 99, at 29-30.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 30-31.
108. Id. at 31.
109. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that reverse engineering to circumvent a "lockout" program in order to make competing games
run on defendant's game system was fair use); See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that replicating the source code and creating a
program able to unlock defendant's game system was fair use).
110. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (2000).
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legitimate fair use in some circumstances."' Therefore, although the
first three reasons to reverse engineer given above are arguably
desirable for public interest by promoting the objectives of Copyright
Law, the fourth purpose poses an especially dangerous situation for
software producers. This danger is due to the relative ease with which
a computer program may be appropriated by second-comers since
software code is especially vulnerable to fast, precise, and
inexpensive copying." 2 Thus, one of the most important questions for
courts to resolve when dealing with a reverse engineering case is how
to balance the goals of public interest in promoting the objectives of
Copyright Law while at the same time retaining sufficient access
restrictions to prevent the outright piracy of computer programs."1
3
2. Case Law Regarding Reverse Engineering and
Copyright Law
Because the ideas embedded in computer programs are not
ascertainable without reverse engineering, Courts have carved out a
limited fair use exception in these cases.' 14 Courts have concluded
that decompilation and disassembly are legal if undertaken for the
purpose of making interoperable or competing products if this is the
only means by which the user can access the program's
uncopyrightable ideas." 5 Two cases that have held that reverse
engineering is a statutory fair use exception to the exclusive rights of
a copyright holder are Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc." 6 and
Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo ofAmerica Inc."17
111. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1520, 1527 (9th Cir. 1992)
(holding that reverse engineering to circumvent a "lockout" program in order to make
competing games run on defendant's game system was fair use); See also Atari Games Corp. v.
Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding that replicating the source
code and creating a program able to unlock defendant's game system was fair use).
112. Dennis S. Karjala, Copyright Protection of Computer Program Structure, 64 BROOK.
L. REV. 519, 532-33 (1998).
113. Michael J. Madison, Legal-Ware: Contract and Copyright in the Digital Age, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 1025, 1097 (1998).
114. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economics
Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479, 524-25 (1998).
115. See generally Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 2000); See
also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1992).
116. Sega, 977F.2dat 1510.
117. Atari, 975 F.2d at 832.
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a. Analysis of Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade,
Inc.1
" 8
In Sega, Accolade wanted to make games that would be operable
on the Sega Genesis game system. 19 However, Sega had included a
"lock out" program on its system that only allowed games with
Sega's initialization code to be played. 120  Accolade reverse
engineered Sega's program in order to obtain the initialization code,
which it then included in its own games, thus making them
compatible with the Sega game system. 121 Upon appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that reverse engineering in this way was fair use., 22 The
Court stated that reverse engineering could be considered fair use if
two conditions were met. 123 First, there had to be a legitimate reason
for reverse engineering. 124 Second, reverse engineering had to be the
sole method of gaining access to the ideas and functional elements
embodied in the computer program. 25 Thus, the court concluded that
even though Accolade's reverse engineering was for commercial
purposes, it was still fair use in this instance.
126
b. Analysis of Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of
America Inc. 1
27
A similar rule was developed in Atari. In this case, Nintendo
designed a program to prevent its system from accepting unauthorized
game cartridges by including a master chip or lock in the console and
slave chips or keys in each of its game cartridges. 28 Atari and
Nintendo developed an agreement in which Nintendo would take
Atari's games and place the key program on them and then resell
them to Atari, who would then sell the Nintendo game system
compatible cartridges to the public. 29 Under this license agreement
Nintendo strictly controlled Atari's access to its technology.' 30 During
118. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 2000).
119. Id. at 1514-15.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 1514-16.
122. Id. at 1527.
123. Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (9th Cir. 2000).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 1522-23.
127. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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the time that Atari and Nintendo were under contractual agreement,
Atari obtained a copy of Nintendo's protection program by falsely
alleging that it needed the program to defend a case. 131 Atari used this
copy to decipher Nintendo's program, and then developed a program
of its own to unlock the master chip lock on the Nintendo game
system. 132 The court in Atari noted the limits of copyright protection.
It stated, "An author cannot acquire patent-like protection by putting
an idea, process, or method of operation in an unintelligible format
and asserting copyright infringement against those who try to
understand that idea, process or method of operation." 33 The court
went on to say, "[w]hen the nature of a work requires intermediate
copying in order to understand the ideas and processes in a
copyrighted work," then intermediate copying is a fair use. 134 For that
reason the court held that "reverse engineering object code to discern
the unprotectible ideas in a computer program is a fair use."' 135 The
court noted that the Copyright Act allows individuals who have a
rightful copy of a work make the necessary efforts to reveal the
work's ideas, processes, and methods of operation.' 36 The Court
concluded that because Atari was not in possession of an authorized
copy of Nintendo's work, it could not use the defense of reverse
engineering. 37 Therefore, although Atari was not able to use reverse
engineering as a defense, this case articulates that reverse engineering
a computer program to obtain unprotected ideas is a fair use under the
Copyright Act.
These two cases show that reverse engineering has been
regarded as a fair use under the federal Copyright Act. However,
there is no case that holds there is a universal right to reverse engineer
for any purpose or in all circumstances. 38 When deciding reverse
engineering cases, courts rely on the doctrine of "fair use" in order to
maintain the balance between public and private rights to copyrighted
works. 39 Thus, the process of reverse engineering is a tool used to
balance public and private rights. 140
131. Id.
132. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 836-37 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
133. Id. at 842.
134. Id. at 843.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 842.
137. Id. at 843.
138. Lemley & McGowan, supra note 114, at 525.
139. Mahajan, supra note 3, at 3317.
140. Id. at 3315.
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V. DMCA PROTECTION FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE
Although copyright law arguably does a good job of balancing
the interests of software creators and the general public, 14 1 software
creators often turn to technological methods to "lock up" their
creations more completely that copyright doctrine allows. Even
before copyright or patent law protected software, software
developers sought to obtain protection for their creations under state
trade secret law. 14 2 This posed a problem when the developers were
intending to sell and widely distribute their works. 143 However,
developers were able to claim trade secrecy in their code by
distributing only the object code and not the source code when selling
their software products. 
144
When a programmer creates software they write the program in
human readable source code. 145 A complier is then used to translate
the source code into object code, a machine-readable sequence of
zeros and ones. 146 Since object code is virtually impossible for
humans to read, 147 some courts held that widely distributed software
programs could retain trade secret status if only object code was
distributed. 148 Thus software creators could widely distribute their
works and yet still claim that the code was "secret" because it was
only intelligible to machines. In this way reverse engineering
machine-readable object code into human readable source code could
be completely stopped no matter whether the objective of the reverse
engineering is a fair use or an unfair use.
A. Technological Protections and Copyright Law
Once copyright protection was given to software in 1980,149
software developers could no longer rely exclusively on trade secret
protection through restricting source code dissemination because
people were allowed to decompile the code under the reverse
141. See supra section IV.
142. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1243-44.
143. Id.
144. See Gen. Corp. v. Grumman Sys. Support Corp., 825 F. Supp. 340, 359 (D. Mass.
1993).
145. Amin, supra note 21 at 21.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. See Data Gen. Corp. v. Digital Computer Controls, Inc., 297 A.2d 433, 436 (Del. Ch.
1971); see also Grumman Sys. Support, 825 F. Supp. at 354-55.
149. See Computer Software Copyright Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015,
3018 (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 117 (2000)).
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engineering copyright fair use exception. 150 Because decompilation
requires making an intermediate copy, software developers first
argued that it was a violation of their exclusive rights to make copies
under § 106(l).151 However, courts determined that intermediate
copying for the purposes of reverse engineering, in order to make
competing or interoperable copies, was fair use where there were no
other means of accessing the uncopyrightable elements of the
software code. 
152
The problem with the fair use limitation for software copyright
holders is that when a code is copied for ostensibly fair use purposes
the copier is likely to obtain a significant amount of protected
expression as well. 153 Copying of software code is quite easy and
proving that the copying was in fact not for fair use can be quite
cumbersome. 154 Therefore, one solution is to not disclose the code to
the public at all. Software developers turned to technological
protection measures to lock up their code. 55 They managed this by
means of encryption of the code, digital locks, password protections,
and other technological methods of protection. 156  However,
technological methods of protection were not very effective. 5 7 The
reason being, if these technological methods were circumvented, they
became useless. 158 Reverse engineering could be used to "unlock"
these "digital locks," leaving software holders in the same position as
before, certain "fair use" actions could be made of their code.
B. The Digital Millennium Copyright Act
The resulting pressure of the software developers to find
protection under copyright law resulted in the Digital Millennium
Copyright Act (DMCA)."5 9 The DMCA was signed into law by
President Clinton on October 28, 1998 and became effective on
150. See supra Section IV; see also Digital Computer Controls, 297 A.2d at 436;
Grumman Sys. Support, 825 F. Supp. at 354-55.
151. 17 U.S.C. § 106(1) (2000).
152. See Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 2000); See also Atari
Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (9th Cir. 1992).
153. O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 516.
154. Menard, supra note 16, at 374.
155. See Dan L. Burk, Anticircumvention Misuse 50 UCLA L. REV. 1095, 1100-01 (2003).
156. See Cheng Lim Saw & Winston T.H.-Koh, Does P2P Have a Future? Perspectives
from Singapore, 13 INT'L J. L. & INFO. TECH. 413,430 (2005).
157. Burk, supra note 155, at 1102.
158. See id.
159. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
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October 28, 2000.160 The DMCA prohibits the circumvention of
technological protection measures.
1 6 1
1. Prohibitions under the DMCA
There are two main prohibitions in 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2000).
The first prohibition, § 1201(a)(1)(A), broadly prohibits the
circumvention of technological measures and is often referred to as
the anti-circumvention provision. 162 It states that "[n]o person shall
circumvent a technological measure that effectively controls access to
a work protected under this title."'1 63 The term "circumvent a
technological measure" is defined in § 1201(a)(3)(A) as the "means to
descramble a scrambled work, to decrypt an encrypted work, or
otherwise avoid, bypass, remove, deactivate, or impair a technological
measure, without the authority of the copyright owner."
' 164
The second prohibition, § 1201(a)(2), is an anti-trafficking
provision.165 It states, "[n]o person shall manufacture, import, offer to
the public, provide, or otherwise traffic in any technology product,
service, device, component, or part thereof .... ,16 6  Section
1201 (a)(2) then lists certain types of products that are prohibited:
* Products designed for the purpose of circumventing;
167
* Products with only limited purpose other than to
circumvent;' 68 or
* Products marketed with the knowledge that they will be used
in circumventing.
169
2. Exceptions under the DMCA
The DMCA is a separate and independent set of regulations on
activities related to the use of copyrighted works, which has been
termed "paracopyright". 170 The exceptions and limitations on the
traditional exclusive rights of copyright owners do not necessarily
160. Menard, supra note 16, at 377-78.
161. 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
162. Id. § 1201(a)(1)(A).
163. Id.
164. Id. § 1201(a)(3)(A).
165. Id. § 1201(a)(2).
166. Id.
167. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(A).
168. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(B).
169. Id. § 1201(a)(2)(C).
170. Burk, supra note 155, at 1096.
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apply. 171 The exception of fair use and specifically reverse
engineering for software as discussed earlier in this note do not
specifically apply to the DMCA.172 Thus, the balance between the
public good and private interests is in danger of tipping too far in
favor of private interests.
The DMCA has its own set of narrowly tailored statutory
exemptions in § 1201 (c)-(j). Exceptions are made for libraries,
educational institutions, government law enforcement and intelligence
agencies, archives, encryption research and security testing.173 The
two exceptions that are of special interest in this paper are the
exception for fair use'74 and the exception for reverse engineering.
These are codified narrower versions of these doctrines discussed
above. In fact, although they are codified, they, in effect, do not exist
at all because by other more sweeping provisions of the DMCA
overshadow them.
Section 1201(c)(1) states that "[n]othing in this section shall
affect rights, remedies, limitations, or defenses to copyright
infringement, including fair use, under this title."'176 However, the
anti-trafficking provision effectively negates the fair use in digital
copyright.1 77 Many critics have argued that the prohibition on
circumvention effectively bars all access to technologically protected
works, not just infringing uses on those works, and that the provision
effectively does not acknowledge fair use as a countervailing value.'
78
By allowing the act of fair use but barring the means necessary to
achieve it, § 1201 reinforces the exclusionary characteristic of digital
technology. 179 This leads commentators to believe that although fair
use is listed as an exception in the DMCA, it remains there in name
only but not in effect.
180
171. CRAIG JOYCE ET AL., COPYRIGHT LAW 813 (6th ed. 2003).
172. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201 (2000).
173. See Id. §§ 1201(d)-U).
174. Id. § 1201(c).
175. Id. § 1201(f).
176. Id. § 1201(c)(1).
177. See Menard, supra note 16, at 384.
178. See Joseph P. Liu, Owning Digital Copies: Copyright Law and the Incidents of Copy
Ownership, 42 WM & MARY L. REv. 1245, 1321 (2001).
179. David Nimmer, A Riff on Fair Use in the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 148 U.
PA. L. REv. 673, 733 (2000).
180. See Menard, supra note 16, at 385.
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Section 1201(f) covers the reverse engineering exception to the
anti-circumvention and anti-trafficking provisions of the DMCA' 8 1
Section 1201(f)(1) states that
[n]otwithstanding the provisions of subsection (a)(1)(A) [the anti-
circumvention provision], a person who has lawfully obtained the
right to use a copy of a computer program may circumvent a
technological measure for the sole purpose of identifying and
analyzing those elements of the program that are necessary to
achieve interoperability of an independently created computer
program with other programs, and that have not previously been
readily available to the person engaging in the circumvention, to
the extent any such acts of identification and analysis do not
constitute infringement . 1.." 82
This is a limited provision. The sole purpose must be for the
purpose of interoperability. 83 Reverse engineering is never allowed
for the manufacturing a competing product, even in cases where
previous courts had determined that reverse engineering was a "fair
use" exception. 184 This is because, as stated above, there is effectively
no "fair use" balancing test allowed under the DMCA.
The DMCA has a strong impact on software developers because
it gives them much more power to control access to their computer
software than was previously available under Copyright Law.185 The
DMCA also had an effect on the necessity of protection for software
developers under contract law. Software developers no longer need to
put provisions in shrinkwrap licenses that prohibit decryption or other
circumvention of their code protections because this protection is
automatically provided by the DMCA.186 Since the DMCA provides a
very detailed exception for reverse engineering,1 87 shrinkwrap
licenses that include prohibitions for reverse engineering should be
preempted by the DMCA.
181. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(f) (2000).
182. Id. § 1201(f)(1).
183. Id.
184. See Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc. 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding
that reverse engineering to circumvent a "lockout" program in order to make competing games
run on defendant's game system was fair use); See also Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am.,
Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992). (holding that replicating the source code and creating a
program able to unlock defendant's game system was fair use).
185. See Menard, supra note 16, at 384.
186. 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2000).
187. Id. § 1201.
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VI. PREEMPTION
Now that contract law protection, copyright law protection, and
DMCA protection have been introduced we will look at how they
interact with each other. When a contract, like a shrinkwrap license,
prohibits a right given to a software user under copyright law there is
a potential conflict between copyright and contract law. Contract law
is state law and Copyright law is federal law.1 88 Preemption is a
method in which state law is subordinated by federal law when the
two are in conflict with one another.189 In some instances specific
causes of action are preempted, while in other cases entire state laws
are preempted. 190 Another option under contract law is that just a
particular provision of the contract will be preempted. 191
There are two types of preemption applicable to copyright law.
192
One is statutory preemption, which is applied through § 301 of the
Copyright Act. 193 The other is constitutional preemption, which
derives from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution 194 and
determines that a state law is preempted when it conflicts with the
goals and objectives of Congress.1 95
A. Statutory Preemption
"Statutory preemption", which is also sometimes called "direct
conflict preemption ' 96 occurs when federal copyright law preempts
state statutes or court decisions that directly conflict with the subject
matter of the Copyright Act. 19 7 Section 301 of the Copyright Act is
the basis of this type of preemption because it states that federal
copyright law governs "all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent
to any of the exclusive rights within the general scope of
copyright." 198 Therefore, laws that grant rights not equivalent to
copyright are not subject to statutory preemption. 
199
188. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1269.
189. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000); U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 8.
190. See e.g., Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software, Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988).
191. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1269.
192. Kwong, supra note 17, at 359.
193. See 17 U.S.C. § 301 (2000).
194. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
195. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 281 (1987).
196. Kwong, supra note 17, at 359.
197. 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
198. Id.
199. Id. § 301(b)(1),(3).
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In the context of contract law, it is generally accepted that
federal copyright law does not preempt all state contract laws but
rather the laws are evaluated on a case-by-case basis to determine
whether they impermissibly create a state right equivalent to a right
under federal copyright law.2°° Some courts have held that contracts
may conflict with the direct terms of the statute by denying the right
to make a "fair use" of the copyrighted work.2°' Courts have held that
copyright law gives a user a right to reverse engineer for fair use
purposes, so a contract provision that expressly prohibits reverse
engineering is statutorily preempted.0 2
There is a general consensus that private freely negotiated
contracts are not equivalent to any of the exclusive rights within
copyright law.20 3 However, the extent to which direct conflict
preemption affects shrinkwrap licenses depends on what is meant by
direct conflict. 20 4 Consensual bargain models (as pertaining to
negotiated agreements) do not apply to such standard form licensing
agreements as shrinkwrap licenses.20 5 Therefore, the issue facing the
courts became one of deciding whether the differences in the
bargaining model between the negotiated context and the standard
form context compelled a different conclusion as to whether § 301 of
the Copyright Act preempted terms given in shrinkwrap licenses.2 °6
1. The Extra Element Test
The authors of the 1976 Copyright Act set specific criteria for
preemption under § 301.207 They sought to clarify the boundary
between federal and state enforcement of proprietary rights in works
of authorship by specifically addressing federal preemption of state
law causes of action in § 301.208 However, "sorting out the impact of
200. See, e.g., S.O.S., Inc. v. Payday, Inc., 886 F.2d 1081, 1088 (9th Cir. 1989)
(interpreting contract terms so as to be consistent with policies of copyright law).
201. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000) (delimiting fair use limitations on exclusive rights).
202. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269-70 (5th Cir. 1988).
203. See, e.g., Expediters Int'l of Wash., Inc. v. Direct Line Cargo Mgmt. Servs. Inc., 995
F. Supp. 468, 483 (D.N.J. 1998) (noting that a contract claim is not equivalent to rights under
copyright law because a promise is required); See also Architectonics, Inc. v. Control Sys., Inc.,
935 F. Supp. 425, 438-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) (recognizing that the consensus among courts and
commentators is that breach of contract claims are not preempted by the Copyright Act).
204. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1272.
205. O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 528.
206. Id.
207. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(a) (2000).
208. See e.g., O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 528 (discussing preemption of state standard
form contract law).
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§ 301 on the wide variety of possible state-created causes of
action .. has proven not to be the easy task that the framers of the
1976 Act envisioned.,
20 9
Section 301 states that federal copyright law exclusively governs
"all legal or equitable rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive
rights within the general scope of copyright., 2 10 The difficulty that
courts have found in examining this test is that "equivalent" has no
stable meaning. 21 Thus, courts have devised a method called the
"extra element" test to determine when state law confers an
equivalent right.212 This test looks to see if there is some "extra
element" in the state statute that is not explicitly present in the
copyright laws, and if this extra element is found then the state law is
considered qualitatively different than copyright law and will not be
preempted.21 3 Most courts have held that for freely negotiated
contracts, the mutual assent and consideration represent the "extra
214
element" necessary to save the contract from preemption.
Therefore, parties are free to individually negotiate a contract
containing provisions that prohibit actions such as fair use that would
ordinarily be allowed under copyright law. This extra element is more
attenuated in the shrinkwrap license context of contract law.
2. Analysis of Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc.
215
Bowers v. Baystate Technologies, Inc. provides an example of a
case where mutual assent and consideration were found in a
shrinkwrap contract, even though the terms were not freely
negotiated.216 The finding of the extra element in an adhesion
contract, such as the one present in Bowers, seems especially tenuous
to this author.
In Bowers, Harold L. Bowers created a template to improve
computer aided design (CAD) software, which lies on top of a CAD
computer and places many CAD commands in a visual and logical
217order. Bowers sold his product with a shrinkwrap license
209. JOYCE, supra note 171, at 1019-20.
210. 17 U.S.C. § 301 (a) (emphasis added).
211. See JOYCE, supra note 171,at 1041.
212. Id.
213. Katz Dochtermann & Epstein, Inc. v. Home Box Office, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d 1957, 1959
(1999).
214. See Lemley, supra note 20, at 1272.
215. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
216. Id.
217. Id. at 1320-21.
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218prohibiting any reverse engineering. Baystate obtained copies of
Bowers' product and three months later released a product which
incorporated many of the same features that were in Bowers'
product. 219 The jury found that Baystate had reverse engineered
Bowers' product to create a competing product. 220 The court on
appeal considered whether Bowers' shrinkwrap license was a valid
prohibition of reverse engineering or whether the Copyright Act
preempted it.
221
In considering the issue of preemption of a shrinkwrap license
provision, the court analyzed the leading cases on the topic of
copyright law, contract law, and preemption. The court first
articulated that federal copyright law does not preempt a state law if
the state cause of action contains an "extra element" instead of, or in
addition to, the acts of reproduction, performance, distribution, or
display, which are protected by federal copyright law.222 The court
held that the mutual assent and consideration required by a contract
claim were that "extra element" necessary to uphold a shrinkwrap
223contract.  The court seemed to have no trouble in assuming that
mutual assent and consideration were present in the shrinkwrap
license between Bowers and Baystate.224
The court noted that Atari found that reverse engineering is a
statutory fair use exception to copyright infringement.225 However,
the court distinguished the Bowers case from Atari by reasoning that
the application of the extra element test to a copyright claim did not
change Atari's findings that reverse engineering is a fair use
exception. 26 In this way the court did not overrule Atari.227 Instead it
noted that although reverse engineering is a fair use exception, as long
as there was a valid contract (even a shrinkwrap contract), the "extra
element" is present, and thus the fair use exception from copyright
protection is contractually prohibited.228
218. Id. at 1322.
219. Id.
220. Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
221. Id. at 1323.
222. Id. at 1324.
223. Id. at 1324-25.
224. Id. at 1325.
225. Id. (citing Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am., Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992)).
226. Bowers v. Baystate Tech., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
227. Id.
228. Seeid. at 1325-26.
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B. Constitutional Preemption
A second type of preemption is applicable to state contract and
federal copyright law. This is "constitutional preemption" sometimes
called "delicate balance preemption."2 29 Section 301 of the Copyright
Act was meant to codify the Supremacy clause of the Constitution,
230
but it left much undecided such that the Supremacy clause can still be
applied directly. 23 Even when a particular cause of action survives
the preemption analysis under § 301, it should still be evaluated under
constitutional preemption. 232 "Theoretically, at least, some state laws
that do not technically fall within the cope of § 301's provisions for
'specific statutory preemption' nevertheless might operate to frustrate
the policies behind the copyright system, which are rooted in Article
I, § 8, cl. 8 of the Constitution., 233
Constitutional Preemption arises from the Supremacy Clause of
the Constitution which states, "This constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; ... shall be
the supreme Law of the Land... any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding. 2 34 There are three
areas in which the Supremacy Clause preempts state law.235 First, it
will preempt where Congress has mandated an express decree.236
Congress has not spoken directly on the issue of federal preemption
of state rights in the context of software programs, so this provision
does not apply. 237 Second, it will preempt where a congressional
regulation in a certain area gives rise to an inference that Congress
left no room for supplementary regulation. 238 In the past it seems that
Congress had generally permitted states to supplement federal
intellectual property protection with State schemes to a certain limited
degree, for example by allowing unfixed creations to be protected by
state copyright law.239 Third, state law is preempted where it conflicts
229. Kwong, supra note 17, at 359-60.
230. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
231. JOYCE, supra note 171, at 1032-35.
232. O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 534.
233. JOYCE, supra note 171, at 1032.
234. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
235. Eric Beal, It's Better to Have Twelve Monkeys Chasing You Than One Gorilla:
Humana, Inc. v. Forsyth, The McCarran-Ferguson Act, RICO, and Deterrence., 5 CONN. INS. L.
J. 751 (1998-1999).
236. California Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra, 479 U.S. 272, 280-81 (1987).
237. See Julie E. Cohen, Copyright and the Jurisprudence of Self-Help, 13 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1089, 1130-31 (1998).
238. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 280-81.
239. JOYCE, supra note 171, at 10341.
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with the federal law to such a degree that it hinders the objectives of
Congress. 240 This last area is the one that gives courts the most
flexibility in determining a preemption issue.24' This particular
element is referred to as "conflict preemption."
Conflict preemption looks to see if the state law should be
preempted because it "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of
the full purposes and objectives of Congress." 242 The difference
between statutory preemption and conflict preemption is that "conflict
preemption requires an inquiry into not only whether the rights at
issue are equivalent to those that the Copyright Act established, but
also consideration of policy decisions underlying the Copyright
Act., 243 Regardless of the applicability of § 301, it is possible for a
court to set aside a licensing scheme that frustrates the Copyright
Act's overall objectives. 244 Claims are evaluated under conflict
preemption when they do not directly conflict with federal copyright
law, but nevertheless "upset the balance struck by Congress." 245 The
Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.24 6 and Davidson & Associates v.
jung47 cases analyze the relationship between federal copyright law
and state law under conflict preemption.
1. Analysis of Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.248
In 1988 the Fifth Circuit, in Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,
considered whether the terms in a shrinkwrap license were
enforceable. 249 Vault made a product that was used in conjunction
with another vendor's software and prevented users from making
unauthorized copies of that software.250 Quaid made a program that
deactivated Vault's software.2  In producing this program Quaid
made several copies of Vault's software code and decompiled and
disassembled it. 252 With each version of Vault's product a license
240. Guerra, 479 U.S. at 281.
241. Mahajan, supra note 3, at 3321.
242. NIMMER, supra note 35, § 1.01 [B][3][a].
243. Kwong, supra note 17, at 360.
244. O'Rourke, supra note 29, at 535.
245. Lemley, supra note 20, at 1272.
246. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
247. Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 635 (8th Cir. 2005).
248. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988).
249. Id. at 255.
250. Id. at 256.
251. Id. at 257.
252. Id.
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agreement was included which specifically prohibited the copying,
modification, translation, decompilation or disassembly of Vault's
program. 3 The court considered whether the terms of this license
were enforceable or were invalid under constitutional preemption. 4
In doing so it concluded that a shrinkwrap agreement is a contract of
adhesion and therefore could only be enforced if the Louisiana
License Act, which enforced terms in shrinkwrap agreements, was a
valid and enforceable statute.255 The court considered § 117(1) of the
Copyright Act, which permits a rightful possessor of a program to
"make or authorize the making of another copy or adaptation of that
computer program provided that such a new copy or adaptation is
created as an essential step in the utilization of the computer program
in conjunction with a machine and that it is used in no other
manner... (emphasis added). 256
The court determined that the copy made by Quaid was "created
as an essential step in the utilization of Vault's [computer] program,"
and that § 117(1) "contained no language to suggest that the copy it
permits must be employed for a use intended by the copyright
owner .... 257 Thus, Quaid's decompilation for the purpose of
producing a product that deactivated Vault's product was an essential
step in Quaid's utilization of Vault's program. The court therefore
concluded that the Louisiana License Act conflicted with the rights of
computer program owners under section 117 of the Copyright Act, so
the restrictions in Vault's shrinkwrap license agreement were
unenforceable under constitutional preemption.258
2592. Analysis of Davidson & Associates v. Jung
In Davidson & Associates v. Jung a group of volunteers created a
non-profit website called bnetd.org which offered game play for a
multi-player games created by Blizzard without having to go to the
Blizzard official site called Battle.net. 260 By necessity, the individuals
reverse engineered Blizzard's protocol language to ensure that their
website worked with the Blizzard games.261 This allowed other users
253. Id. at 256.
254. Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 270 (5th Cir. 1988).
255. Id.
256. 17 U.S.C. § 117(1) (1977) (emphasis added).
257. Vault, 847 F.2d at 261.
258. Id. at 270.
259. Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
260. Id. at 635.
261. Id. at 636.
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to play without necessarily verifying the authenticity of their
software.262 Each of the creators of bnetd.org had agreed to the terms
of the End User License Agreement (EULA) and the Terms Of Use
(TOU) in order to play the Blizzard game contained on the CD-ROM.
Both the TOU and EULA prohibited reverse engineering. 263 The court
ruled that by agreeing to the terms of the EULA and TOU these
individuals had expressly relinquished their rights to reverse
engineer.264 The court quoted the reasoning from Bowers: "private
parties are free to contractually forego the limited ability to reverse
engineer a software product under the exemptions of the Copyright
Act .... ,,26' The court also quoted the Bowers dissent: "a state can
permit parties to contract away a fair use defense or to agree not to
engage in uses of copyrighted material that are permitted by the
copyright law if the contract is freely negotiated.,266 The court stated
that although Bowers dealt with express preemption, the reasoning
applied with equal force to conflict preemption as well.267
VII. HARD CASES MAKE BAD LAW - ADHESION
CONTRACTS SHOULD NOT PREEMPT COPYRIGHT
LAW FAIR USE
This author finds the reasoning in both Bowers and Davidson
baffling because both cases state that copyright law will not preempt
contract law in cases where contracts are freely negotiated, but the
facts of both cases show that the contracts were in fact not freely
negotiated. 268 Both were agreements made by parties of vastly
differing bargaining positions, where the terms were given on a "take
it or leave it" basis only by the party in power - a contract of
adhesion. 269 The "extra element" of mutual assent and consideration
are by definition not present in mass contracts such as shrinkwrap,
clickwrap, or End User License Agreements. In both Bowers and
262. Id.
263. Id. at 634.
264. Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630, 639 (8th Cir. 2005).
265. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1325-26 (Fed. Cir.
2003)).
266. Id. (quoting Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2003)
(Dyk, J. dissenting)).
267. ld. at 639.
268. See generally Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
269. See generally Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
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Davidson the defendants were "reaping where they had not sewn,"
270
so this makes these cases difficult to uphold on their facts. However,
"hard cases make bad law," and these two cases show exactly that.
Just because the defendants were "free riding" does not mean that
courts should create a legal precedent to uphold any and all terms
present in adhesion contracts. Courts should not allow software
creators to use adhesion contracts to create a zone of protection
around their products far wider than both traditional copyright law
and the DMCA allows.
Software creators should not be allowed to use contract law to
give themselves perpetual monopolies. If adhesion contracts can
never be preempted by copyright law, the delicate balancing of fair
use will be completely lost. This would not only limit a consumer's
choice for competing products but would also halt development of
interoperable products making consumers totally dependant on the
first companies to arrive in a particular market.
The national objective of copyright law is "to promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts., 271 This is achieved by providing
incentives to the authors of the copyrightable works by giving them
exclusive rights to protect the discrimination and reproduction of their
works for a limited time.272 Copyright law balances the author's
exclusive rights with the goal of public knowledge, which is
promoted through the public gaining access to the author's
273
writings. Sometimes the goal of Congress to benefit the public is
best achieved through creating exceptions to the exclusive rights of a
copyright owner.274 One of these exceptions is fair use,275 which in the
context of computer software is embodied in reverse engineering.
276
Not all reverse engineering is permitted, but courts have held that
when reverse engineering meets the copyright fair use elements it
should be allowed.277 Therefore, when looking at cases that involve
270. See generally Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003);
Davidson & Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
271. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
272. Id.
273. See id.
274. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 107-122 (2000) (establishing exceptions to the exclusive right
granted with copyright).
275. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
276. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
277. See McManis, supra note 99 at 50; see also Sega Enters. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977
F.2d. 1510, 1520 (9th Cir. 1992); see also Atari, 975 F.2d 832, 843 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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adhesion contracts with provisions that prohibit reverse engineering,
courts should be wary of allowing these contracts provisions to stand.
VIII. PROTECTING REVERSE ENGINEERING FOR
COMPETING PRODUCTS UNDER THE DMCA
Courts should be even more careful with adhesion contracts that
prohibit the DMCA reverse engineering exceptions. Since most
software products are protected by some sort of technological
measure for protection of the code, the DMCA allowance for reverse
engineering will become increasingly important in future cases.
278
Due to the fact that the DMCA is a separate "paracopyright"
provision, statutory preemption under section 301(d) does not
apply.279 Therefore, only constitutional preemption can be applied to
contracts conflicting with the DMCA. Also, the DMCA's exception
for reverse engineering is much narrower than that of general
copyright law.280 The three elements that must be met to qualify as for
the reverse engineering exception under the DMCA are: (1) one must
lawfully obtain the right to use the program; (2) the product must be a
computer program; and (3) one's purpose must be only to identify and
analyze the program to achieve interoperability. 281 Thus, the DMCA
should be interpreted to prevent the adhesion contracts prohibition on
reverse engineering in all but the most extreme cases.
The DMCA creates a narrower definition of when reverse
engineering can be claimed than traditional copyright law allows.
These narrow exceptions apply only to those cases that involve the
subject matter of the DMCA - circumventions of technological
protection measures. Furthermore, the DMCA only allows reverse
engineering for the purpose of creating an interoperable product.2 82
The DMCA does not allow reverse engineering for the purpose of
creating a competing product.283 Therefore, knowing that reverse
engineering for the purposes of creating competing products is
already unavailable should encourage courts to vigorously protect the
right to reverse engineer for the purpose of creating interoperable
products. In other words, when courts face a contract law versus
278. See Menard, supra note 16, at 377 (noting that the DMCA is "the most significant
change to the copyright law since... 1976").
279. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (2000).
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DMCA law preemption issue, they should weigh the cost to "the
progress of sciences and useful arts" and rule to preempt broad
prohibition clauses in adhesion contracts with the reverse engineering
rights granted in the DMCA.
IX. CONCLUSION
Software developers used contract law, such as licensing, to
protect their creations before they had protection under traditional
forms of intellectual property such as copyright law.284 However, now
that software is protected under copyright law; software developers
should not be allowed to continue to use contract law to supplement
their protections. Copyright law carefully balances the interests of an
individual creator with the good of the public in having access to that
creation through the "fair use" test.28 5 However, software developers
currently try to use license terms to prohibit acts that would otherwise
be fair use. This "licensing" scheme is especially unfair when the
consumer is given the license on a "take-it-or-leave-it" basis. This no
negotiation contract is called an "adhesion contract," and shrinkwrap
licenses are an example of this type.286 When licenses prohibit
otherwise fair use actions contract law and copyright law are put in
conflict. Traditionally, preemption law says that federal laws win over
state laws when they are in conflict with one another. 28 7 Copyright
law is federal law, but contract law is only state law. Thus, courts
should be able to use a preemption analysis to subjugate unfair license
terms by determining that the fair use test of copyright law trumps the
license terms of an adhesion contract. However, recently there has
been a trend to uphold these adhesion contract terms.288 This trend
must stop.
In the light of the Constitution's stated goal of "promoting the
sciences and useful arts" courts should be especially careful to protect
the right to reverse engineer to create interoperable software
products. The creation of interoperable products through reverse
engineering is specifically allowed under the DMCA.289 Traditional
copyright law's definition of fair use is also broad enough to cover the
284. See supra Section III.
285. See 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
286. See Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd., 847 F.2d 255, 269 (5th Cir. 1988) (citing the
district court's language).
287. See discussion supra Section VI.
288. See e.g., Bowers v. Baystate Techs., Inc., 320 F.3d 1317 (Fed. Cir. 2003); Davidson
& Associates v. Jung, 422 F.3d 630 (8th Cir. 2005).
289. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000).
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use of reverse engineering to create interoperable products. 290 Thus
there is a strong basis for protecting this type of reverse engineering.
However, if adhesion contracts were allowed to prohibit this use,
software owners would be able to create monopolies entire market
sectors leaving consumers with no product choices. Courts should use
both statutory and constitutional preemption to protect the right to
reverse engineer at least interoperable software products, by finding
that the DMCA provisions preempt any license provisions which
broadly prohibit all forms of reverse engineering.
The decisions in Bowers and Davidson come dangerously close
to ruling that both statutory preemption and constitutional preemption
do not apply to any adhesion contract.29' Courts should be wary of
applying Bowers and Davidson to situations where contract law and
copyright law conflict. Courts should especially not to apply Bowers
or Davidson to situations where adhesion contracts are used to
prohibit reverse engineering for the creation interoperable products.
Instead the courts should have a strong presumption that the DMCA
and traditional copyright law should preempt adhesion contracts.
A strong presumption of preemption of contracts of adhesion
will promote the "progress of the sciences and useful arts." This
presumption of preemption comports with the goals of copyright law,
which is to give incentive to creators while at the same time allowing
the public to benefit from their creations.292 This balancing is the main
purpose of the "fair use" exception in traditional copyright law,
293sharing this purpose with the reverse engineering exception.
Reverse engineering is just a specific type of "fair use" that often
appears in the context of computer software.294 This presumption does
not negate the use of shrinkwrap licenses, but limits them to uses for
the protection of software developers in areas where copyright law
has not spoken. A presumption of preemption of adhesion contracts
both furthers the national objectives of copyright law and leaves the
market free to develop interoperable products, which promotes the
progress of the sciences and useful arts. If courts do not reverse the
recent trend by creating a strong presumption of copyright law over
contract law, shrinkwrap licenses may very well suffocate fair use.
290. See discussion supra Section IV.
291. See discussion supra Section VI.
292. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
293. See Mahajan, supra note 3, at 3315.
294. See generally Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir.
1992).
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